Maatukathe IV Session 8

Maatukathe IV Session 8
May 31, 2016
The Mythic Society, Bangalore
Minutes 

Schema and Actualisation 

Singular 
Particular                                   X                                           Universal 
Individual 

Type X Token

Knowledge of universals (Science) 
Knowledge from universals (Individuals: like people, events)

Identification versus differentiation 
Example as distinct from token

Example
- something articulated from lived experience 
- need to be "saved" when disputing a theory for which it is cited as an evidence 

- But lived experience is structured through or rather exhibits inherited scheme of distinctions 
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Aspiring to live well and responsibly 
Worlds we encounter and make
Theory shapes experience  

Maatukathe IV Session 7

Maatukathe IV Session 7
30.05.2016
Mythic Society, Bangalore 
Minutes 

• Research Involves operating with concepts
• Conceiving knowledge: perception vs. action oriented 

Perception-Oriented Approach 

• Language and sense-perception are media of knowledge 
• Through language: not accessible to all (particular medium) 
• Through perception: accessible to all (universal medium)
• Intelligibles vs. sensibles 
• Intellect vs. senses
• Reason or intellect makes available the essence or nature of objects 
• A universal language of thought underlying the particular languages that people use 
• Theory as revealing the world of (ideal) objects, the intelligibles - the ideas, essences and nature 
• Theory construction as removing impediments to intellection 
• Objects and agents are prior to action
• Perception exhibits the agent - action - object scheme. 
• Cognition is either 
• an action by an agent on an object (making), or
• an effect on an agent by the object (causation or by god)

Action-Oriented Approach

• Action is prior to agents and objects
• Perception is a learnt skill (or action) (Cf: C S Pierce)
• The features and objects are distinguished depending on the practical task at hand
• Even the recognition of the practical task depends on training and the skills we possess
• Leant schemes of distinctions are at work while perceiving 

Action: Two Constitutive Relationships

• Means-Ends
• Means-Objects (objectives: objects are not independent of objectives

To identify and deal with objects is to operate with conceptual means. 

Action and Articulation

• Calling for action: "Fire!"
• Draw attention to features: "The tree is uprooted"
• Articulation also through gestures, graphs, maps, drawings etc. 

Action and Sign Action 

• Doing and showing 
• Actualisation vs. Schema 
• Performing vs. Cognizing 

Action in its schematic aspect is a sign. When the action is looked at as designed to be a sign, then it is a sign action. by iterating this, even in sign-action, one can distinguish "performing" from "cognizing" aspects. 

Knowing a fact versus understanding a concept 

- Things made vs. Things generated

- Use objects vs. Sign objects

- Making vs. Representing 

- Object talk vs. Meta talk

- Talk involving reflection and attention to ways f saying 

- Introduction of terms 

Talk: Subject and Predicate 

• Singular Statements: "Wall is white"
• Making statements by applying a predicate to a subject unleashes a host of implication threads. 
• Talking attentively and reflectively versus meta-talk 
• Construction, reconstruction and representation 

Maatukathe IV, Session 2

Maatukathe IV, Session 2

Ninasam, Heggodu

April 28, 2016

Minutes: Elizabeth Thomas

How do we characterise a life of learning? We can say that shaping a Life of learning is not for scholarly pursuits alone, it is equally part of all sorts of pursuits as part of leading a good life. In such an engagement having knowledge can be reframed as possessing dispositions/skills rather than as having information. Knowledge can be seen as art (skill/discipline, which is an action disposition. An action disposition is a propensity to act in a particular way. Such dispositions are available in common and are improvable by social cooperation. Knowledge thus is an action disposition - improvable and available in common.

We can make a subtle distinction between habit and disposition. While both dispositions and habits are acquired, it is possible to drill in habits but not dispositions. Zen Buddhism talks about idea of control of emotions, of the body, but it is not about controlling the will, but mastering of the senses in closely observing things, without active involvement. One can say habits in which one is able to exercise such control is part of an ethos.

Most human dispositions are acquired, and thus require both a milieu of learning and active cultivation. Even natural human dispositions such as language learning needs a milieu. An individual is born in and through socio-cultural processes, which are i) cultural- cultivated habits and ethos and ii) mediated through signs and schemes.

What is a sign or scheme? A sign is that which fulfils a communicating role. Action by its nature is a sign.  Identifying a structure in an action is a scheme. For instance, mentally processing the different stages of cooking a dish, or observing someone drinking water is to schematize. Here scheme could be a succession of acts or a spatial pattern.  Another example is two people raising their hands, they have performed the same action, actualised the same scheme. Schemes are there in maps, visual things, concepts and perceptions, since even perceptions involves making distinctions. We can therefore say, socialization or education involves:

1) a scheme of distinctions

2) certain instruments/ abilities to use them

3) and standards of judgment about the right use

Our everyday life involves concepts and distinctions and so does any form of specialized knowledge whether that of an academic, a carpenter, doctor, musician and so on. Each distinction involves a learning situation. Every learner is in an act of imitation and knows how to distinguish relevant and irrelevant actions in the course of scheme building. The learning process involves a performance, that is, repetition of another's action. The repetition involved in performance or replicating an action requires a scheme of actualization.

Operating with concepts

'Operating with concepts' is a term of art / technical term for making distinctions through perceptual schemes or words or concepts or more generally signs.  Perceptual scheme have precedence over conceptual scheme, because the latter requires language. In contrast to this formulation, the dominant epistemological tradition says that in the process of understanding, first sensory perception happens and then interpretation takes place. Instead we can say perceptual schemes are available and one is already making distinctions in the process of seeing something.  Scheme acquisition is thus a way of seeing something.

A situation, action, person can be introduced through - description as well as acquaintance. Words are deeds first, descriptions only secondarily. Example, Calling out 'fire!' presents a situation than merely a word.

We learn concepts through various methods. Through a) socialization;  b) deliberate learning;

c) deliberate construction- that is introduction of  a term and delimiting its use; d) deliberate reconstruction, re-configuring of knowledge already received

Deconstruction, that is breaking down an idea to everyday language ,and reconstruction, re-building it into a more economical concept, are the accustomed concepts of the elite/ educated discourse (bildungssprace). In this process however, a number of scientific terminologies of a discipline oozes into everyday life. Eg. Acidity or Gravity

The construction of concepts and models can be grasped through the following structure. Let us say we are simultaneously part of three possible worlds:

1) The lived world :  This world depends on one's knowledge and horizon of thinking. So say a Pandit Nehru or Garcia Marquez dying will make an impact on a person only if these figures are part of their lived world. Similarly if we say 'It didn’t rain in Saurashtra/ or Bangalore this summer' that has some implications for your lived world. The lived world is the accustomed environment and ways of dealing with it. Typically misunderstandings and miscommunications occur between people because  their lived  worlds are different from each other's.

2) The world we live: This is the milieu or environment in which we are embedded, where lots of things might happen on which we have no direct control or interest, nevertheless these contain institutions in which we are embedded and the past of oneself and one's environment.

3) The world we aspire to live in : Most of our activities and everyday projects are directed towards this aspired world.

Social and Natural sciences attempt to grasp the world we live in through constructing concepts from the lived world.

----------------

To further understand the importance of the distinctions of The lived world and The world we live in a text from the New York Times editorial, 'Why the Post office makes America Great'  was discussed.

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/03/opinion/why-the-post-office-makes-america-great.html?_r=0

The discussion was about the importance of properly functioning public institutions such as post offices, libraries, museums and such other to our everyday lives. We attempted to probe using  examples and anecdotes what makes certain institutions successful and why certain others don’t function as well. Examples were drawn from different domains like urban planning and residential architecture, environment sustenance projects, flourishing of libraries and reading culture in various spaces. It was noticed that one of the marks of  thriving institutions as well as projects is attention to logistics and human cooperation. The text shows that one distinct characteristic of the American post office is the trust they have been able to build among their customers over the years, perhaps a clear contrast to Turkey (an example the text cites) and India. It was noted that even recent innovations in the postal sector in India is based on by-passing the human quotient by depending on the success of technological applications. This is not to say Indians or the Turks are not trustworthy, but that coordination and cooperation at various systemic levels has not been paid attention to in these places. 

Maatukathe IV, Session 3

Maatukathe IV, Session 3 

Ninasam, Heggodu

April 29, 2016 

Minutes: Lakshmi Arya 

The day began with a discussion of a movie screened the previous evening (Inspector Barnaby). Parallels were drawn between the investigative processes by which Inspector Barnaby arrives at the truth, and the processes of research, in which each of us, as research scholars, are engaged. The similarities observed can be clustered under the following heads: (a) the formulation of the right question (subject to correction and revision); (b) the procedures by which we arrive at answers, which involve methods of investigation, and sifting through relevant (as opposed to irrelevant) clues or information; and (c) proposing a narrative / hypothesis.

The rest of the sessions picked up on the theme of the slogans regarding India, which had been introduced the previous day. First, the idea of the Constitution was discussed. There were two levels at which this discussion was initiated: One was a textual analysis of parts of the Preamble of the Constitution, and the other was its location in the context of the liberal tradition of the 19th century. Liberalism is a particularly 19th century tradition of thought. There was a reference to Barzun’s periodization of developments in the West: If the 16th century was the time of religious revolution in the West, the 17th, that of monarchical revolution, the 19th century was the age of liberal individualism. 

It was emphasized that the Constitution is a contract, agreed to by all the people of India. Parts of this contract are inviolable: the fundamental rights. It was also emphasized that the Constitutional document makes sense within the intellectual context of the 19th century. The 19th century was when the idea of nation was articulated in parts of Europe. Inextricable from this idea, is that of the citizen; someone who is no longer subject to an emperor, but a subject of the state: A citizen-subject. The King, likewise, goes from being the sovereign to the first servant. The purpose of education undergoes a transformation too, in line with the other transitions towards nation-building. Education becomes the pre-condition of being a responsible citizen. The purpose of education, in other words, is to produce a responsible citizen. To achieve this end, institutions are established in the 19th century. Institutions like the University, museums, and symphony orchestras are all educative in this sense. 

These 19th century ideas have relevance for India. Macaulay’s idea of educating Indians had this end as well: It was meant to turn out citizens. Hence his debate with the Orientalists on what classics should be part of higher education in India? The Orientalists, who had recently discovered the Indian textual tradition, were of the view that education should be in the Indian classics. Macaulay’s disagreement with them was that these classics could not produce citizens. It was also noted that the 19th century had another prevalent idea: that of civilization. The work of the Orientalists contributed to this idea, by re-discovering the ancient Indian and Chinese civilisations. They found that there were other Ancients, much like their own Greeks and the Romans, in India and China. One of the slogans identified in the previous day’s sessions (that of India being an ancient civilisation) has this contextual significance. 

The idea of transition is captured in another of the ‘slogans’ identified in the previous day’s sessions: That Indian is a developing country. Development here is shorthand for transition, or a set of transitions towards modernity. When we say development, we usually think economic development. However, only part of this ‘development’ is economic: the movement from an agrarian economy to an industrial one. There are various other transitions: The re-arrangement of social relations along a contractual model, the replacement of kingships with a liberal-democratic form of state; the recognition of individual rights (i.e. the centrality of individual as the bearer of rights); likewise, a recognition of human rights; and, finally, in terms of knowledge-production, the giving up of myths for scientific inquiry. Thus, there were a range of transitions: Economic, social, political, and epistemic.

To return to the idea of the Constitution as contract, it was observed that contracts are open to dispute. Indeed, many of the political disputes that have wracked modern India have taken place within the Constitutional framework. The discussion among the participants centred around two such disputes: Universal temple entry and the Ramjanmabhoomi controversy. The debate around temple entry takes this form: Everyone (women, Dalits) should be allowed to enter temples, because they are public spaces. This debate does not make sense outside of the idea of the ‘public’. The social contract very fundamentally makes a distinction between public and private spheres. The public sphere is the domain of citizenship; it is where we are all citizens, irrespective of what we are in our private spheres (Hindus, Muslims, women, Dalits, tribes). If temples are public spaces, it follows that all citizens must have access to them. Within this discourse, other ideas of temples and the rituals connected with them, seem incongruous and even ridiculous: The idea, for instance, that women cannot enter the Aiyappa temple, because the god there has chosen a celibate life, and does not want to look upon women. There are various iterations of the idea of the public in contemporary India: Public health, public decency / morality, public reason (the sphere where issues are debated and discussed). 

Another fundamental premise of the social contract is that of harm: The harm that citizens can cause one another. As a legal dispute, the Ramjanmabhoomi controversy takes these contours. There is a person who is harmed, and that person is Ram Lalla. Most modern disputes are articulated within this Constitutional framework in India, insofar as they all evoke ideas of rights, public access, and harm. Another example was taken to illustrate this: The debates around the beef ban. Some Muslim groups have contended that the beef ban violates their right to work. This takes the beef issue out of the domain of culture (and its public or private nature) to the relatively neutral terrain of work. I am reminded of a similar turn to the abortion debate in Australia: The framing of the abortion issue as one of public health, and access to it, and not as one of religion versus secular citizenship for women.

There is a certain sense of universality that is associated with the idea of the public, of citizenship and of fundamental rights. It supposedly includes everyone, leaving out nobody. Yet, there is an innate contradiction in liberalism. The discussion pointed out this contradiction. If free speech, as a fundamental right, were granted to everyone, there would be no free speech. As Milton famously said, the Catholics could not be given free speech, because if they were, they would not allow it, having no conception of free speech themselves. Another contradiction lies in the idea of freedom itself. If freedom were absolute, everyone would not have it. Some groups would oppress others, as happens in a capitalist society. Liberal ‘universal’ freedom necessarily excludes some, in order to sustain itself. 

Given that the predominant framework of conducting disputes and discussions in contemporary India is the liberal, democratic, Constitutional framework, what is the role of the academician? One reflection that emerged was that the role was to make alternatives available. To create milieus of discussion which draw upon traditions other than the liberal one. To create other conversations; indeed to have other forms of mathukathe.

Maatukathe IV, Session 1

Maatukathe IV, Session 1 

Ninasam, Heggodu

April 27, 2016 

Minutes: Shashikala Srinivasan

Mathukathe began with the recapitulation of the questions animating the sessions so far: what it is to lead a good life (how to live well and responsibly) and how to lead a life of learning. Living well involves a) reflection on our actions and conditions under which we live b) the awareness that life goes on before, during and after reflection which means actions cannot be indefinitely postponed.

A distinction was made between engagement as a citizen (grahastha – one who sustains family and society) versus enquirer. Two logically distinct types of reflection were singled out: Deliberation to decide versus reflection to make alternatives available. While the former is used in executive function, the latter is mainly used in advisory functions. While reflection involves mapping different alternatives, deciding involves fixing one alternatives among others. Often the process involves the capacity to judge which objectives (ends) are right and which means are appropriate.

Another important point reiterated was that we inherit Customs, Institutions and the accompanying language to talk about them which together form “traditions.” As we grow up, we get acquainted with and accustomed to:

• A Habitat (distinguished into objects, events, customs and institutions
• Some grade of knowing how to deal with it
• Some grade of knowing how to use the language accompanying it.

Language here functions as a scheme of distinction and our experience is structured through these schemes of distinctions passed on to us.  How do these distinctions come into play? Not through deliberately constructed theories for we can we can switch from one set of distinction to another. These distinctions are passed on to us through use.  

The session then moved on to the conditions that sustain and make the way/s we live possible. We were asked to visualize the “globalized world” at a different time (in the form of a thought experiment). The attempt was to lay out a scheme to distinguish times and worlds. The question “What does it mean to speak about our ways of living depend on certain conditions that sustain our world” was posed.  Different kinds of institutions/environment - social (families, schools, castes, clubs), legal and political (courts, parliament), economic (farms, factories, markets), technical and infrastructural environment (roads, railways, internet , gas, electricity) as well as semiotic preconditions (traffic lights, railways signals, standardized languages and scripts)  were listed as various kinds of institutions/systems required to make communication across space and time possible. Systems of representations such as calendars, maps are required to coordinate activities across time and place and these are conditions that sustain and  make the way we live possible today.

Next, the question “What kind of life of learning and institutions to accompany it exist?” was posed. Various kinds of semiotic skills were and arts were listed: a) The art of articulation, persuasion and argumentation b) The art of interpretation. The academic institutions, libraries, museums, parks, reserve forests etc...and corresponding ethos and legal structures are the accompanying institutions to make possible the corresponding forms of life of learning.

We become what we are, mainly by Learning.  Learning takes place in an environment shaped by our past/s or our traditions. Since we are Macaulay’s children, our inheritance, broadly can be classified in to two sets of traditions: The Indian – the family background, rituals, practices around us that govern our everyday life and the Western comprising most of our institutions of governance and education.

Conceiving the task of education, particularly higher education involves the notion of maturing into wisdom.  It involves the acquisition for a capacity for judgement through life long practice and reflection. Often higher education as academic study is distinguished from learning through apprenticeship and training for a job. It involves the acquisition of theoretical competence and competence to do research.

Higher education can be seen as a process of initiating one into themes, questions and forms of enquiry along with the traditions in which they are embedded. How are questions and themes related to enquiry?  Investigation presupposes adequately clear questions. The clarity of the questions depends on the contexts they have. Theoretical questions may be inspired by practical issues in one’s milieu such as reservations, notion of social justice and therefore may be more difficult to resolve. Notions of academic freedom likely to be embedded in intellectual traditions. Contexts can include intellectual traditions and not just spatial and temporal but to be understood in terms of conceptual unpacking.

Post-lunch Session

The afternoon session was a brain-storming on expectations by way of discussing a text by Adam Alter, Popular Science, in http://thepointmag.com/2014/criticism/popular-science. Two ways of approaching the world through disciplines were distinguished: a) where one has a broad-based approach and focuses on information and content, often cutting across disciplinary boundaries b) burrowing /covering a narrow field in greater depth and showing how large effects grow from small, with effects often cutting across disciplines. The importance of good science writing consisting “not the sharing of particular ideas, but the sharing of general approaches to perceiving the world” was emphasized. 

The discussion was linked to the purpose of higher education which is train more than a “specialist.” While it was recognized that no teaching could be possible without particular ideas, the point however, was always general.  Whether the skill of reasoning in one field makes possible easy forays into other disciplines was taken up. The idea of research as operating with concepts was put forward.  Questions such as what is it to enter a discipline, what is it shift from the language of one discipline to another, what is it to fit into a particular scheme of distinctions, its histories and connections were raised. The fragility and inadequacy of conceptual distinctions the moment we enter new surroundings was highlighted with examples.

The last session of the day focussed on “Grasping the World and the times we live in” and introduced the “givens” or the preconditions of the way we live today. This was captured in the form of recurring slogans to reflect on:

• We live in a world of nation-states enmeshed by globalized network of trade and production chains
• India is a developing country
• India is a constitutional democratic republic
• India has one of the ancient civilizations

Both Science and Polity are constantly remade

• In case of science reconstruction of the predicates passed on from the past
• In case of political associations, the re-designing of the institutions passed on from the past.
• The task is that of evolving the appropriate standards

The next few sessions would probe into the implications of these slogans.

Maatukathe III Session 3

Maatukathe III Session 3 
04.04.2015
Minutes: Shashikala Srinivasan

Reading a Classic

The class began with two questions: What is a classical text and why must we read it? Secondly, if the classical text is from another period (which it most often is), what kind of problems do we confront when we read it and how do we overcome the difficulties in accessing the text? 

The discussion on the first question led to the following points. We read classics because they are conferred the place of being great works by a tradition (or a culture). They are important to a culture because they set standards and represent the best and most important thoughts of a tradition. To recognize that it is part of our tradition is also to simultaneously recognize that it has influenced us and continues to influence us in significant ways. In other words, it is part of our cultural inheritance which has played a role in our formation and is considered part of the “educated discourse.” In order to illuminate the notion of an educated discourse, a contrast was set up between “pass the salt and pepper” kind of talk and an elevated saying like “sambhavami yuge yuge.”  The latter is seen as part of our educated discourse. The Idea of going to a classic then is to reflect on notions of an educated discourse which, with or without your knowledge, cultivates in you an attitude in the way you go about the world.  Further, it was noted that “the educated discourse” is not a distinction made between people (as in “the educated lot” and “the uneducated lot”) but within the language we use. Our educated discourse is that part of our everyday language which has traces of tradition – in terms of diction, institutions, modes of thinking, vocabulary - and can be considered to have their roots in classical traditions. The question of whether the educated discourse is an explanatory layer over everyday language or whether it is constitutive of and is embodied in the distinctions of everyday language (where the distinctions are available as actions but not as explanations of those actions) was raised by the participants. The question was resolved by equating the educated discourse to what we can call the reflective reconstructions of a culture that influences the way people go about their world. Thus, reading a classical text (whether written, oral or performative) gives us access to this reflection by making available the methodological distinctions and bringing into focus the distinctions of the educated discourse. This provides us with a clearer understanding of our actions and the way we go about the world.

We can put a classic to test by confirming its influence in different periods of time. However, even while we attempt to conceptualize these influences, we must be prepared to encounter modes of thought and reflection that are different from ours. Just as people from the same background are likely to talk the same idiom but when we meet different people from different backgrounds, different idioms and alternatives are generated, similarly, when we revisit a classic which is from a different time and period, we are bound to encounter modes of thinking that we are unaccustomed to. The more remote the classical text, the more likely we are to construct an alternative to what we are accustomed to. Therefore, the objective must not be seen as one of “recovering” the past but one of illuminating our present and making alternative models available for our contemporary world. The access to different modes of thinking would help us expand the range of possibilities about what it means to be a human being today.

The task of constructing alternative modes of thinking from the classical traditions requires that we have some idea of the various difficulties we may confront while accessing the classical text, leading to a discussion on the second question posed in the beginning of the class. We must remember that the milieu from which the classical text comes is different from ours and so are its concerns. We must necessarily, therefore must distance ourself from what we are accustomed to, in order to be able to understand the text. We must desist from projecting contemporary themes and meanings to the past works. The terms we encounter may mean differently. For instance, in Nussbaum’s “Saving Aristotle’s Appearance,” an instance of a classical text chosen for study, words such as phainomena or appearances, paradeigmata, puzzles, endoxa mean differently from what we think them to mean today. Most scholars remain inattentive to this difference in meaning and this leads to various kinds of misinterpretations. This frustrates our initial aim of accessing the classical text. Art of interpretation here then, is “to walk on the edge” for while we cannot help make Aristotle (or any other classical text) our contemporary, we must also remember not to make the mistake of making Aristotle our contemporary. To conceptualize these differences and similarities then is the function of reading a classical text. In this way, we enter into a genuine conversation with the text rather than to agree or disagree with what it is being said in it or from the point of view of judging it as right or wrong in terms of what it says.

Post Lunch Session: Saving Aristotle’s Appearances

The post lunch session took up the article “Saving Aristotle’s appearance” by Martha Nussbaum. The purpose was to illustrate what it means to read a classic and what are the interpretative tools that required. A close reading of the text, with attention to various kinds of words, their meanings and distinctions that are systematically built up by the author was the main focus of the exercise. Within what intellectual tradition does “Saving the Appearance” gain its meaning and why do appearances need saving was discussed in detail. In order to understand our current scientific methods we must reflect on the elements of our educated discourse and the long tradition of reflection on scientific method that is present. When Aristotle claims that his aim – in science, metaphysics and ethics – is to save appearances and their truth, he comes from an intellectual tradition that preserves appearances. In doing this, Aristotle was opposing the Platonic and Socrates’ line of thinking which opposed the realm of human society, the phainomena or appearances (and the cognitive states associated with them) to an extra-human realm/activity which was considered to supply us with paradigms that are purer than we are. In this platonic tradition, the opinions of imperfect, finite, limited human beings was seen as being incapable of providing evidence for truth. Nor was the world of appearances seen as capable of providing truth with its “witnesses” and paradigms (to be understood as a style or mode of thinking).  In the platonic tradition, to do philosophy then is to take the “long road to truth” where the true, real and genuine understanding are to be found outside human societies and appearances are always deemed to be false. The identification of the “pure and unhypothetical point” which is not relative to human society and language, in the Platonian tradition, is seen as the only starting point of science. Aristotle challenges this tradition by arguing that the true and real are to be found only inside appearances (within human societies, within what we say, see and believe) and not by resorting to any extra-human acts. Even the first principles of science are arrived at by ordering the mass of contradictions from appearances through a dialectical practice (through dialogue and resolving of contradictions) and not from an apiori principle which have their origins in special rational acts of intuitions. The first principle, “witnesses” and paradeigmata or the modes of thinking, Aristotle claims, are all to be found (or arrived at) within appearances. Appearances is all there is. It follows from this that scientific thinking then is not opposed to ordinary ways of thinking we perform in our everyday life but an accentuation of it. The difference is of a degree and not kind.

The title of the article indicates that Nussbaum is of the opinion that Aristotle’s notion of appearances needs “saving.” In what sense is Nussabaum “saving Aristotle’s appearances” was discussed in detail. First, Nussbaum saves Aristotle’s appearances by showing how it was misinterpreted by the Baconian, empiricist tradition to mean “hard data”, in the sense of interpretation-free data. However, this is to project later developments onto the Aristotelian notion of appearances.  Aristotle’s phainomena, which meant “what people believe and say,” made no distinction between data obtained by pure perception and beliefs of a community. Instead it involves the notion of experience which includes what a human observer perceives as his world, using his/her cognitive faculties (or Kritika) which involves making distinctions in the act of going about one’s life. Nussbaum challenges the dominant, Baconion interpretation through a textual analysis of Aristotle’s works to make available Aristotle’s notion of appearances to us. Secondly, she defends his methods which are confined to appearances. Aristotle methods follows setting up a puzzle (another important term, which consists of bringing the contradictory views of various people on an issue to the surface) and a way to think through what various people say, marshalling various considerations in such a way that we are left with no contradiction. The method of “appearance saving” therefore requires intellectual commitment to the principle of non-contradiction and maintaining consistency. Most importantly, it includes a return to phainomena and showing that our account preserves them as true. How endoxa, best understood as a pre-propositional articulation, is interpreted as “beliefs” (which are propositional) by Nussabum was pointed out. This provides us with an interesting example of how one of the most respectable scholars of Aristotle, despite her explicitly stated aim of being faithful to meanings of various terms as used by Aristotle, can still miss something important. This throws into sharp relief the kind of difficulties we are likely to face when we are reading a classical text. An account of how and why this misinterpretation happens by Nussbaum and a detailed discussion and analysis of the section on Aristotle’s method was postponed to the next day of the workshop.

Maatukathe I Session 8

Maatukathe I 

Session 8 (?)

Minutes: Chaitra Mathighatta 

 Comparative Science of Cultures

• Social Sciences – is investigating society. I.e. where and when do we demarcate one society from another? There are three approaches to investigate societies.  They are

1.       Customs and worldviews

2.       Focus on production (technologies) and relations of production (political and legal structures)

3.       Capabilities, Institutions, text discourses and traditions

These approaches more are less use meta-level categories to deal with object level – questions

• Societies are not self enclosed. How do we recognize a society and what are the purposes for which we do that? Is one of the crucial issues and an idea of the historical growth of the study of society would probably help us in making aware of why such a question is being asked.

• First approaches to study societies begin in 18^th century. This can be study of societies in European traditions. It starts with the study of customs and worldviews. These approaches were also helpful in facilitating the smooth administration of colonial bureaucracy. It can also be said that study of customs and worldviews were initiate to administer people of the colonies and many of the scholars who studied these societies were themselves administrators. The idea of “worldview” comes from Bible and it was thought that Church is the institution which facilitates the formation of worldviews amongst people. Genesis in Bible was the basis for the worldview. European scholars were keen on finding similar things about India.

• The second approach to study society was using “production relations”. This approach began to gain momentum with the wake of industrialization. It was embedded in the notion of production (technology) as a means to satisfy the needs of people. (Ex. Europe had a feudal mode of production and India had Asiatic mode of production)

• Third approach, which needs to be established properly, is “capability” approach. Here capabilities are much larger conceptions than mode of production. It involves capabilities, institutions and text – traditions (It must not be confused with Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s “capabilities” as they are more or less contractual obligations. It is different from capabilities to study societies). Here say “custom” serves as a concept to investigate an object level question. In this approach, if we try building an idea of how to study society, following logical mode of investigation can be built.

Let us ask a question, what colour Indians wear when they mourn?

• This question is an observant level question and not a participant level one. Therefore we must begin with ideas from Europe.

1.       Black is the colour of mourning in Europe

2.       What is the colour of mourning in India?

3.       “X” is the colour of mourning in Europe

In this case “X” – is subject of predicate, “X” – is variable

• Let us take some topic now to move further like Subject and Friendly. Chetan is Friendly – in this case “Chetan” is subject and “Friendly” is Predicate. One can now ask, what is subject? Here it is “Chetan”. One can ask whether it is “Person” (Chetan) or the “term”. Subject and Predicate must be treated as the identifying and differentiating expressions.

• “Variable”:

Chetan is friendly

         X is friendly

         X is variable

• Definite and Indefinite descriptions: Let us examine some sentences

A Bangalorean is friendly – means someone is a Bangalorean and he is friendly 

The Bangalorean is friendly – There is one definite person, he is a Bangalorean and he is friendly.

• Definite and Indefinite descriptions as identifying expressions:

A Bangalorean is friendly – There is X, X is a Bangalorean and X is friendly

Bangaloreans are friendly – can be quite indefinite

-          Any Bangalorean is friendly

-          If X is a Bangalorean, X is friendly

The Bangalorean is friendly

-          There is one definite person, he is a Bangalorean and he is friendly

-          There is one definite X (There is only one X), X is a Bangalorean and X is friendly

Here Bangalorean are friendly does not have existential significance as it refers to a class. One really do not assume that there is such a class. To make it clear further, Bangaloreans are friendly defines a class, but does not assume that there are member who belong to the class called Bangaloreans. It is a property definition of a class called Bangaloreans.

• Let us get back to Colour of Mourning – What is the colour of mourning in India?

“Black” is the “colour of mourning” in Europe

“X” is the “colour of mourning” in Europe

“X” is the “Y” (Here “X” is variable and “Y” is predicate)

“X” is the “colour of mourning” in “Y” (“colour of mourning” is predicate and X & Y are variables)

• Object V/s meta predicate (can refer back to previous class)

Example: “Truth” is a Meta – predicate because it is attributing a quality to a statement or a description. Similarly “exists” is also a Meta – predicate.

• Transition from object to Meta level

“Flying Horse” exists – the sentence asserts that the description or predicate “Flying Horse” exists. Here the Flying horse alone does not mean anything but it exists means an assertion. In this case the existence is parasitic on something (flying horse here) and therefore “exists” becomes a meta-predicate.

Cultures vary variously:

Generating meta-predicates of different sorts as search tools in enquiry of different (other) cultures is a challenge. For example in case of mourning one can formulate following problems

-          If there is mourning, are there colours to represent it?

-          If there is a death in a family, what other alternative features than mourning be represented by wearing of black can be found?

These tools lead to profoundly different descriptions of the world of Indian rituals for example. Following case can illustrate a different story with wearing different colour cloths.

-          Wearing white is a sign of leading a life of renunciation in the face of death of near one

-          All auspicious acts/rituals are done with wearing white

Now with the above example, we can go back to the question of cultures. If cultures vary variously, can “religion” be one of the factors absent in other cultures.

This is completely different from the regular questions of sociology. This is not what other religions than Christianity governs the life of people in other cultures?

It is all about, what are the ways other tha religion can be found as generative of practices in other cultures?