Maatukathe II Session 1

Matukathe II

Minutes of Meeting

Session 1

14.12.2013

Notes: Ashwin Kumar 

The session began with an invitation to recount paradigmatic instances of what we consider knowledge in our everyday life. This lead to a discussion about what is knowledge. Some participants felt that recounting instances of knowledge would first of all require us to possess some definition of knowledge. Some definitions were attempted: systematic study of a domain; scientific study of things etc. It was noticed that such definitions exclude many instances of knowledge. For example, if knowledge is the systematic study of a domain, then driving, by this reckoning, cannot be knowledge because knowledge of driving does not involve the systematic study of anything. Some participants suggested that driving is a skill and cannot be merged together with knowledge. However, our everyday intuition would suggest that driving is also knowledge. For instance, when it is said, “he knows how to drive”, “do you know driving?” etc., there is some sense that to be able to drive is to have some knowledge, albeit in a form different from the ‘systematic study of a domain’. At any rate, the distinction between skill and systematic study of a domain presupposes some prior definition of knowledge, in the absence of which, such a distinction might very well be superfluous.

So it was suggested that a good working definition for knowledge would be “anything that can be learnt”. This definition has the advantage that it includes all those instances of knowledge that are left out in the previous definitions. A further question cropped up: if knowledge is anything that can be learnt, then, would robbing a bank, for instance, be considered knowledge? The answer has to be in the affirmative. Regardless of whether it is good or bad, robbing a bank is something which requires learning and involves specific skills. Also, if one tried to make a moral distinction about knowledge, saying only those things that are good (by whatever sense of the term) can be considered knowledge, that would result in pretty much anything being considered as not knowledge. For example, the making of an atom bomb, which could easily be a candidate for knowledge in some sense of the term, could be equally easily argued to be not knowledge in another sense of the term. [Could we say that, moral evaluation itself being a form of knowledge, cannot become a concept for demarcating knowledge? - AK]

This led to discussion about the idea behind the present course: how to lead a life of learning. There is a premium placed on learning in our everyday intuition as a thing worthy of desire, (as against a thing widely desired). Learning, despite occurring mostly at the level of the individual, presupposes a community, where a specific set of dispositions, skill sets and learnables are available and flourish. Therefore, to think about leading a life of learning is to concomitantly think about the formation and sustenance of such communities. One aspect of this exercise is to understand what are the specific behaviours that undermine community formation and those that sustain communities. Another distinction that is relevant here is the one between given communities and built communities. While it may be the case that given-communities seldom reflect on the aspect of community formation, most built-communities face this question at some point or the other.