Stephen Philips On Nyaya

Stephen Philips On Nyaya

Lecture at Azim Premji University, Bangalore, on May 15, 2014 

Notes: Elizabeth Thomas

Nyaya, Ethics of Virtue

Character ethics vs. criterion ethics: 

Character ethics is that which helps build character. Criterion ethics is that which helps in deciding criteria or standards for distinguishing right and wrong actions, aids in justifying our positions. The study of ethics from the 17^th to the 19^th centuries in the west was consumed by this question of criteria to judge right action. 

Buddhism/ Jainism- Nastika philosophy focuses primarily on character –charity, truthfulness etc. But question arises about why these character traits are good, why they are morally privileged over something else like greed, for instance. To which philosophers might respond by saying that itself is not the point, the point is that a person of good character or disposition is best situated to judge criterion, or assess arguments. For example, a good musician can judge good music. In Buddhist, Jain philosophy all this paves the way towards nirvana, or mukti. So a person of good character or karma or disposition is likely to reach it faster, than someone who does not cultivate it. 

The Nyayikas add another aspect to character. That of Testimony: who can give it- an apta- an expert- most often parents or gurus. Apta is one who knows the truth and wants to communicate it faithfully. Perception, inference, testimony, analogy (which is marginal), are sources of knowledge (pramana) in Nyaya. For nyayikas ethical criterion theory was based on testimony.  Testimony is the knowledge source for dharma or right action. They argue that we get norms of living from the testimony of others. There can be testimony about imperceptible things- such as the nature of heavan or life and so on. Or about societal norms such as trustworthiness, which are in a way broader than ethical norms- so even a carpenter can have ethical norms about a good piece of furniture. 

One would find various interpretations if we look at the texts written by the philosophers. For instance the Mimasa sutra 1.1.2 (?? Not sure) will say dharma is characterized by injunction. Another will say right action is framed by testimony.

Conventionalism as an ethical theory

So the Nyayikas argue that the criteria of ethical actions (or right actions) are set by conventions. Linguistic conventions connect to patterns of right action- vyavahara. Speech especially is based on conventions.  How does this traditions address the problem of ethical reform? Do norms change without reason? If yes, then conventions or norms are anomalies-unlike natural occurrences. If no, then these reasons seem to depend on (or appeal to) standards not set by conventions or outside of existing conventions. We can see in our own world that ethical practices change, women’s liberation is a new convention. 

Later Nyaya philosophy was also struggling about questions about the existence of God. Udyayana the later day Nyayaika made a criteriological argument for the existence of God (Ishwara). He says standards and connected actional abilities, vyavahara (like of weavers, or potters, or children learning language) are dependent on a standard setter- on a confident being, an apta, and that is Ishwara. He says that human beings sometimes break the mould (like make an exquisite carpet, or a pot) and invent something, or set a new standard. This action is channeling of the divine- it shows the presence of Ishwara. How is change in conventions possible? Through Ishwara, or through breaking norms. So the first step is that we get ethical societal conventions through testimony, but there is room for divine creativity. The divine or ishwara manifests most as a teacher, an exemplary teacher who breaks existing conventions, it could be Gandhi or Buddha or anyone else one knows

In the Yogasutras- yoga is said to give the practitioners the ability to make new citta, there is place for creativity. For new patterns of thought and excellence to emerge

Krishna- Arjuna in the Gita:  the usual reading of the dialogue between them is to see it as a tussle between duty vs. ahimsa (perhaps a metaphor from Yogasutra). A more apt reading will be to see in the dialogue the demands of being a witness/ an apta- to live according to nature and cultivate your inner awareness such that action itself is not important. Arjuna is called upon to live so.

One can see that Arjuna is becoming more a more like the yogi. Process of yoga is to purify the self by focusing on action. Arjuna is becoming more like Krishna- an ideal ethical observer, a creative spirit- who no longer requires following convention, who can come up with new norms.

Character ethics usually says that individual does not need external criteria to judge, intuition is the theory of ethical judgment there. Here the problem of objectivity arises.  The nyayikas try to solve this with their criteriological argument.

Question-Answers (my pen ran out half way so I tried to reconstruct it from memory..so many questions are half answered)

Q: If the idea of divine or ishwara was a later forumulation in Nyaya then how was the idea of reform or intuition worked out in earlier nyaya philosophers? What were their thoughts organized around?

A: Earlier Nyayaikas were actually like debate coaches in royal courts, who were experts at telling how to construct or win an argument, what sorts of errors are possible etc. so they didn’t really think about these matters of the universe etc. it was only later thinkers like Udyayana, (another name beginning with v..) who thought about these

Q: What is the role of inference and perception in nyaya thinking, if testimony is primary?-
A: one way of saying this is testimony is also based on perception and inference, and therefore there is no testimony without experience. But especially in the domain of ethics you cannot observe or perceive the world and know right from wrong, there the word of the parent or guru holds immense importance in so far that your perception of the world, of right and wrong is also based on testimony.
Q: Doesn’t it look like conventionalism is atavistic and authoritarian? One could claim that only the experts will decide what is right and wrong, or what is valid testimony. Also that since texts are in the control of one community they will decide what is right, so it can be the hegemony of a few.
A: Well, we need to distinguish between theory and the uses its put to, a misapplication can occur in the hands of those who are in power, but that’s not essentially what the theory is arguing or advocating. Secondly, although conventions are important to appreciate and approve of things, the philosophy makes a lot of room for creativity. So nyaya texts will tell you even a mlecha can be an apta, in so far as he has unique knowledge about a particular domain. And again most of nyaya thoughts use actions like weaving and pottery to make their arguments, which is a sign that it was not authoritarianism but creativity which was their concern.

Q: Is it possible to say that the breaking of norms is not so much a radical moment, but something enabled by a reflection on the old or existing ones, so its internal to the domain. Like in a university. In which case it need not be explained as an anomaly.

A:  we must not see radical as a pejorative, or a negative connotation that it has acquired today. There is some newness..but there is not much which tells us what happens when 2 norms stare at each other.

Q: it looks like criterion theory is dependent on character theory, since the former is dependent on testimony, so who gives testimony is crucial. So it seems to come back to character ethics.

A: Yes character is very important, its cultivation is crucial. Swabhava and swadharma seem to be related, one cannot be performed without realization of the other..But their concern is new norms or creative breaks, rather than old norms..

Q: If we look at the nationalist movement and the novels written in the period, we see a lot of creative solutions and responses to the colonial moment. But here reform is depicted as a secular one not a divine one..is this relevant for the present?

A: Udyayana says a pot maker makes an equisite pot is a divine act. He needs to be appreciated. He might be a bad husband, but he has done a good act. ..we can see that divine manifests in the form of good action..didnt get the full answer

Q: Only the Yogi can break conventions, because he knows everyone’s interests, not just his own. What is the notion of self here..? There is an implication that I can break norms and but others must follow it. Didn’t get the answer.

Again some question about Buddhists and Nyayikas. Didn’t get. Buddhists say world is an effect, of conscious agents, Nyayikas counter by saying in the case of the divine moment the weaver or potter are also agents with bodies. They give the example of grass, and say grass is a divine effect..to which Buddhists say it is an effect of planting etc?? this might be spurious recording, am not at all sure what was the discussion!!

Some question about Nyaya and Vedanta which I couldn’t understand. Could only get this much: There is a lot of difference between nyaya and Vedanta’s theories of action. The advaitas claim that there is no action or self as such, things happen and you are part of it. Later Ramanuja and others question this and give place to agent in action?